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DERIVATIVE INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER DEPRIZIO: IF
THAT IS THE LAW, THEN THE LAW IS WRONG
I.

INTRODUCTION

The primary policy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Code)1 is to distribute equitably debtors' assets among their creditors.2
Preference law3 achieves equitable distribution by preventing individual
creditors from enhancing their ability to recover debts owed to them at
the expense of other creditors. 4 In order to best effectuate the Code's
preference policy, trustees have the power to avoid' certain transfers6
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
2. Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and AfterAcquired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 292 (1967).
3. A detailed account of preference law under the Code is found in Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984). The Code gives the trustee the power to:
(b) ... avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or

(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). See also infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text for further
policy discussion.
4. Individual remedies which exist against the debtor outside a bankruptcy context, are
substituted with a collective process of paying claims. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 728, 763.
The bankruptcy distribution scheme is premised on the notion that rational creditors would
privately agree to such a distribution system if they were to bargain together prior to the
bankruptcy filing. Id. at 728.
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). Avoiding powers enable the trustee to prevent the effective transfer to other entities of debtor and estate properties made prior to bankruptcy. Id.
These avoiding powers are contained in sections 544 to 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.

§§ 544-548.
6. The Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" as: "[E]very mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, disposing of or parting with property or with an
interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption." Id. § 101(50).
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made prior to the debtors' declarations of bankruptcy.7
The Code separates into two sections trustees' abilities to avoid preferential transfers and their abilities to recover those transfers.' Section
547(b) of the Code defines the elements of a preferential transfer.9 When
the creditor to whom the debtor has made transfers is an "outsider," 10
the trustee may avoid transfers made within ninety days prior to the
debtor's declaration of bankruptcy.1 1 When the creditor is an "insider," 2 the trustee has a one-year reach-back period.1 3 Once the transfer is deemed avoidable, section 550 identifies from whom the trustee
could then recover.1 4 Recovery can be from the initial transferee, the
party for whose benefit the transfer was made or any mediate transferee. 15 Because both insider- and outsider-creditors can be either initial,
benefitted or mediate transferees, the Code's bifurcation of the avoidance
and recovery powers creates a situation in which trustees could potentially recover from a party whose status as an outsider would not otherwise render the transfer avoidable. 6
7. With regard to preferences in particular, the trustee's avoiding powers are codified in
section 547. Id. § 547.
8. Id. §§ 547(b), 550(a) (preferential transfers and recovery powers).
9. Id. § 547(C). See supra note 3 for statutory language.
10. An outsider, or non-insider, is any party who does not fall into the Code's definition of
insider. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), (vi); see also infra note 12.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). See supra note 3 for statutory language.
12. An insider is defined by the Code as a director, officer or person who is in control of
the debtor, as well as any relative of such persons. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), (vi).
13. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). See supra note 3 for statutory language.
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 550. Section 550 states the liability of a transferee of an avoided transfer as follows:
(a) ... to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section ... 547... of this
title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred,
or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under subsection (a)(2) of this section from(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of
the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
(c) The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under subsection (a) of
this section.
d. § 550(a), (b), (c).
15. Id. § 550(a)(1), (2). See supra note 14 for statutory language.
16. This situation arises when the trustee seeks to recover from the outsider-creditor, who
is likewise considered an initial transferee. The trustee is permitted to do so under section
550(a)(1), even though the transfer is not actually avoidable as against that initial transferee
because the time period requirement of section 547(b)(4)(A) has not been satisfied. The prime
example of this situation occurs when a non-insider lender obtains an insider guaranty. Such
an occurrence has come to be known as the Deprizio situation after the Seventh Circuit's opin-
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In the past, divergent schools of thought developed regarding the

issue of recovering transfers from an outsider-creditor not responsible for
the avoidance. The majority of cases prevented the trustee from recovering from this non-responsible party,17 while the minority permitted re-

covery.18 In April 1989, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand FinancialCorp. (Deprizio),19 greatly in-

fluenced judicial and scholarly perception of the bifurcation of preferential avoidance and recovery. 20 The court extended the one-year time

period of section 547(b) to avoid transfers made to non-insider lenders
who obtained insider guaranties. 21 This holding allows trustees to recover from non-insider lenders who are initial transferees 22 of transfers
ion in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The
sections below will discuss how and why this situation arises. See infra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc. (In re Midwestern Co.), 96
Bankr. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Levit v. Melrose
Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986),
rev'dsub nom. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr.
545 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part andrev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Aerco
Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio
Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling), 97 Bankr. 77
(W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturer Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re
Robinson Bros. Drilling), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Coastal Petroleum Corp. v. Union
Bank & Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.), 91 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988);
Mixon v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc. (In re Big Three Transp., Inc.), 41 Bankr. 16 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1983).
19. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
20. Since the Deprizio opinion was issued, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have followed the
Seventh Circuit's holding. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.),
899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); Robinson Bros,, 892 F.2d 850. Furthermore, several commentaries have been written. See eg., Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference Exposure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee
Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511, 516-29 (1990) (commentator summarizes Deprizio and highlights
difficulties which flow from decision); Lurey & Beckham, InsiderPreferences, IndirectPreferences, and Section 550 ofthe Code, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CHAPTER 11 PRACTICE AFTER
ALLIED, FEDERATED AND DREXEL: THE PLAYERS, THE POWERS AND THE PLAN 253, 27678 (1990) (commentators disagree with Deprizio holding); Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the
Law of Preferences, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 344 (1981) (commentator supports Deprizio's
reading of sections 547(b) and 550(a) and its extended liability time period); Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 530, 531-40
(1989) (questions Deprizio holding and suggestions use of section 550(a)(2) instead of section
550(a)(1) for purposes of recovery). While the Deprizio court essentially adopted the minority
school of thought's perspective, the overwhelming significance of the case is that it was the first
time a circuit court had done so.
21. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200-01; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B). Seesupra note 3 for statutory language.
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1).
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made outside the ninety-day time period but within one year of the bank-

ruptcy filing.
This Note first discusses the Deprizio court's analysis of the Code's

current language.23 It agrees with the court's conclusion that as the
Code is now written recovery is permitted from a party, even though the
party's status as a non-insider, would not permit avoiding the transfer as
a preference.2' Furthermore, such non-insiders cannot benefit from the
bankruptcy court's equity powers since the Code's language is unambiguous.2 5 The Note then addresses each argument which the creditors in
Deprizio advanced and the court rejected. It disagrees with the court's

reasoning that extended liability does not threaten Code policy26 and
demonstrates that the application of the one-year liability period to out-

sider-creditors penalizes outsider-creditors who have not manipulated
the debtor's situation for their own benefit.27 The Note then proposes
that, while the wisdom of the results reached by the interplay between

sections 547(b) and 550 is questionable, it is not the courts' function to
advance policy at the expense of the written scheme.2" Therefore, the
author suggests an amendment to the Code.

II.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Unlike the majority of courts, 29 the Seventh Circuit in Levit v. Inger-

soll Rand Financial Corp. (Deprizio)3° refused to invoke its equitable

powers to avoid holding the outsider-lender liable for the recovery of the
transfer.3 1 It determined that the Code's language was unambiguous,

23. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
24. The Deprizio court held that when a payment to an outside creditor benefits an inside
creditor, including a guarantor, then the recovery period is one year. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at
1200-01.
25. "'There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.'" Id. at 1197 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). Many of the courts in the majority
line of cases, on the other hand, acknowledge the Code's language yet refuse to allow recovery
due to equitable considerations. See, eg., Midwestern Co., 96 Bankr. at 226; Aerco Metals, Inc.
60 Bankr. at 82; Cove Patio Corp., 19 Bankr. at 844.
26. See infra notes 141-68 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 169-201 and accompanying text.
28. See Pitts, supra note 20, at 361.
29. See supra note 17 for a list of cases which follow the majority school of thought.
30. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 1200. The court suggests that the exceptions which exist in Bankruptcy Code
section 547 (both the affirmative defenses in subsection (c) as well as the requirements in subsection (b)) provide adequate assurances to lenders; hence reliance on "equity" or "policy"
arguments are not needed. Id. It states that "[i]f these exclusions and exemptions are not
'enough,' creditors should complain to Congress." Id. This Note argues that the provisions
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and therefore the court "simply read and applied" it.32 Such a literal
reading of the Code could have wide-ranging and socially undesirable
effects. 33 This uncertainty surrounding the extent of the court's holding
creates enormous policy problems and adds a significant economic burden to the business community.3 4
The classic Deprizio situation involves three parties: the debtor, the
insider guarantor and the lender. 35 The lender receives a guaranty from
an insider of the debtor.36 Between ninety days and one year before the
debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the debtor either has paid down or
extinguished the loan.3 7 Upon filing for bankruptcy, the trustee then
seeks to recover the payments as preferential.3 8
In the first of the two-part analysis, the transfer is found to be pref39 The argument centers on the inerential as to the insider-guarantor.
sider-guarantor as the party who is benefited by the transfer, rather than
the outsider-lender as the party to whom the transfer was made.' Because a guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the debtor, he
is a "creditor" according to section 101(9) of the Code.4 1 The requirement of section 547(b)(1) that the transfer be "for the benefit of a creditor" is satisfied, and because an insider is involved in the transfer, the
applicable time period for recovering transfers is one year.42
Having found the transfer to be preferential, and therefore avoidable, the recovery aspect of the analysis is then activated.4 3 Section
upon which the Deprizio court relied are far from "enough," thus mandating Congressional
intervention to amend the Code. See infra notes 202-53 and accompanying text.
32. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1197-98. The Deprizio court noted that "[s]ection 547(b)
defines which transfers are 'avoidable'. No one doubts that a transfer to Lender produces a
'benefit' for Guarantor. After [section] 547 defines which transfers may be avoided, [section]
550(a) identifies who is responsible for payment: 'the initial transferee of such transfer or the
entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.'" Id. at 1194. Furthermore, "[mI]ore than
language lies behind this approach. The trustee's power to avoid preferences... is essential to
make the bankruptcy case a collective proceeding .... " Id.
33. See infra notes 196-231 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
35. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1187.
36. See id. at 1187-88.
37. See id. at 1188.
38. Id. The Code empowers the trustee to avoid any transfer the debtor made to a creditor
as preferential if all five elements of section 547(b) have been satisfied. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1988). See infra note 3 for statutory language.
39. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190-91, 1195-96.
40. See id. at 1194. When the transfer is made to the lender, the guarantor's potential
liability is reduced. Id. at 1190.
41. Id. at 1189; 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1988).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B).
43. See Deprzio, 874 F.2d at 1196.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:239

550(a)(1) of the Code provides for recovery from either the initial transferee (the lender) or the party for whose benefit the transfer was made
(the insider-guarantor whose status rendered the transfer avoidable)." If
the section 547(b)(1) "for the benefit of a creditor" provision is utilized in

order to render the transfer voidable, then the lender, as the "initial
transferee" under section 550(a)(1), becomes liable to the debtor's estate
for the value of the property transferred.4 5
A less apparent, but nonetheless logical derivation of the classic scenario, emerges from the connection between sections 547(b)(1) and

550(a)(1). This derivation involves more than the three parties found in
the original Deprizio case. The lender is secured party number one (SP 1 ).
SPI is over-secured46 but does not obtain a guaranty. Another creditor,
SP 2, takes a junior security interest4 7 in the same collateral as SPI. SP 2 is

under-securedand does receive a personal guaranty from an insider of the
borrower. Upon payment to SP1 , the collateral is "freed up" for use by

SP2 ." As SP2's security position improves, the insider-guarantor's liability is reduced. Any payment to SP1 is thus "for the benefit of a credi-

tor."'49 Furthermore, because the benefited creditor is an insider, the

liability time period is one year.50 Therefore, although SP, did not obtain
the guaranty, as the initial transferee it may be liable for the amount of
the transfer."1 Accordingly, where subsequent creditors obtain security
interests and guaranties in the same previously encumbered property, SPI
could be liable.5 2
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). While section 547(b)(4) specifies the liability time
period of the basis of whether or not the creditor was an insider, according to section 550(a),
the trustee's ability to recover the preference is not similarly dependent. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at
1190; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 550(a). See also Lurey & Beckham, supra note 20, at 13-18
for a discussion of how the two sections are combined in order to extend the one-year time
period of section 547(b)(4) to include outside creditors in possession of inside guaranties.
45. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(1), 550(a)(1).
46. "An oversecured creditor is a holder of an allowed secured claim which is secured by
collateral of greater value than the allowed secured claim." Farmers Home Admin. v. Farmers State Bank, 68 Bankr. 282, 285 (D. S.D. 1986).
47. The holder of a junior security interest takes a subordinated position to other secured
parties and is entitled to recovery only after the superior claims have been satisfied. Securities
& Exch. Comm'n v. Central-Illinois Sec. Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 107 (1949) ("the preferred claims
...were entitled to absolute priority and that what remained to junior security holders after
satisfying this priority was necessarily their fair share").
48. As the debt owed to SPI is paid down, SPI needs less of the security interest in order to
protect its position. As its needs are lessened, more funds become available to satisfy SP 2's
debt. Thus, the funds are "freed up."
49. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1).
50. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
51. Id. § 550(a)(1).
52. The Deprizio court discounted the possibility that this situation might occur in an
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The drafters of the Code determined that two liability periods were
needed to deal with the different concerns raised by insider and noninsider groups.5 3 Insiders, by their very characterization under the Code,
have potentially greater opportunities than non-insiders to manipulate
the distribution of the debtor's assets. 4 The imposition of a longer time
period was an attempt to impede such manipulation.55 While extending
the insider's preferential liability time period may accomplish the goal of
reducing the insider's ability to manipulate the situation, it does so in an

inequitable manner. The interplay between sections 547(b) and 550 penalizes the outsider-creditor in order to punish the insider by allowing

the trustee to recover a transfer which is, according to section 547(b)(4),
only preferential to the insider.5 6
The insider has the presumption of control by virtue of the fact that
57
the Code defines an insider as a "person in control of the debtor.
Therefore, only the insider poses a definite threat to the goal of equitable
distribution during the period ninety days to one year after the bankruptcy filing. Absent proof of actual control, the outsider-lender should
retain the protection afforded by the Code, confronting only the ninetyday liability period. 8
Certain commercial consequences further illustrate the undesirabil-

ity of extending liability.59 Extending the liability time period contributes to inefficient lending' ° and increased bankruptcy filings.6 1 The
attempt to soothe the anxieties of lenders. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200. However, the court's
reasoning is faulty. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. Accordingly, its discussion
of the defensive use of section 547(c)(2) does little to constrain the effects of its holding. See
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200.
53. Section 547(b)(4)(A) provides a ninety-day reach-back period for non-insiders, while
(4)(B) sets forth a one-year limit for insiders. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), (B). Ninety days
is a sufficient period for reasonably alert lenders to recognize that one creditor is being preferred over another and to protect themselves by propelling the debtor into bankruptcy.
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1194-95.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), (vi). Through their control of the debtor, insiders will be the first to recognize that the debtor is ailing. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195. Accordingly, they will be in the advantageous position of making preferential payments to
themselves. The Deprizio court believed that "[o]utside creditors, aware of this risk, would
monitor more closely, or grab assets themselves.., or precipitate bankruptcy at the smallest
sign of trouble ....

."

Id.

55. Because of the "long period for insiders, even the prescient managers who first see the
end coming are unlikely to be able to prefer themselves in distribution." Id.
56. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 550(a). The argument "for extended recovery from
outside creditors flows directly from these interlocked provisions." Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190.
57. 11 U.S.C. § I01(3)(B)(iii).
58. See infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 169-95 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
61. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
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outsider-lender has no real recourse against the
insider, 62 and section
63
547(c)'s exceptions to liability do little to help.

III. LEVIT V INGERSOLL RAND FINANCIAL CORP. (DEPRzIo):
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Facts of the Case

In 1980, V.N. Deprizio Construction Co. (the Company) was
awarded a major Chicago subway extension contract.'

4

By 1982, the

difficulties.65

Company was experiencing financial
The Company attempted to ease its financial predicament by borrowing money from the
City of Chicago, and several other sources.6 6 The Company's president,
Richard Deprizio, and his brothers, Robert and Edward, all insiders,
personally guaranteed some of the Company's debts to these lenders.67

The Company made payments to several creditors more than ninety
days before, but within one year of, filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-

tion.

8

Thereafter, the debtor's trustee filed suit in order to declare the

payments avoidable preferences under section 547 and to recover the
value for the benefit of the estate according to section 550.69 The trustee
claimed that the payments to these non-insider creditors were "for the
benefit" of insider-guarantors "because every dollar paid to the outside
62. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text. Section 547(c) lists a series of situations which, if met, prevents the trustee from avoiding the transfer, although technically it
would still be considered preferential. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). The exceptions are popularly referred to as: the contemporaneous exchange exception, id. § 547(c)(1); the ordinary course of
business exception, id. § 547(c)(2); the purchase money security interest exception, id.
§ 547(c)(3); the net-result exception, id. § 547(c)(4); and the inventory and accounts receivable
exception. Id. § 547(c)(5).
64. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The record is devoid of detail regarding the personal guarantees given. The parties, however, acted under the assumption that "one or more of Deprizio's insiders personally
guaranteed some of Deprizio's debts to its creditors." Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re
V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545, 549 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (footnote omitted), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
68. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1188. In addition to those debts, the corporation was indebted to
an employee pension and welfare plan and to the United States for delinquent withholding
taxes. Id. The trustee contended that the insiders had also executed personal guaranties in
favor of these creditors and that payments had likewise been made to them within one year,
but outside ninety days, of fMling. Id.
69. Id. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee broad avoiding powers in order to prevent
the transfer of debtor and estate properties. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547, 548, 549(a), 550
(1988). Section 550 allows the trustee to recover the property, once it has been avoided under
one of these sections. Id. § 550.
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creditor reduced the insider's exposure by the same amount." 70
B.
1.

Case History

The bankruptcy court

Upon being confronted with the issue of extended preference liabil-

ity, the bankruptcy court followed the two-transfer theory set forth in
Goldbergerv. Davis Jay CorregatedBox Corp. (In re Mercon Industries,

Inc.). 71 As stated by the Mercon court, the two-transfer theory divided
the payments made to the creditors into two categories so that two sepa-

rate transfers were found to exist.72 The transfers which were found to
have been made from the debtor to the insider-guarantorsin satisfaction
of their contingent liability, were avoidable since the allowable time pe-

riod under section 547(b)(4)(B) is one year.7

The transfers to the out-

sider-creditors, however, were not avoidable since they had occurred

more than ninety days prior to bankruptcy.7 4 Accordingly, the Deprizio
bankruptcy court held that the transfers to the outsider-creditors were

not avoidable.7
The Deprizio bankruptcy court supported its holding with an equita7
ble argument 76 advocated by the bankruptcy commentator, Collier,1

and utilized by other majority courts.7

The Deprizio court stated that "a

literal application of section 550(a) would permit the trustee to recover

from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and deserves protection. In
such circumstances the bankruptcy court should use its equitable powers

to prevent an inequitable result .

. . ."'

The court further stated that

70. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1188.
71. 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Levit v. Melrose Park Natl Bank (In re

V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478, 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986), rev'd sub nom. Levit
v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. Mercon, 37 Bankr. at 552.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 552-53; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
75. Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 480. The Deprizio bankruptcy court held that "the payments to
the creditors herein made by the debtor more than [ninety] days but within one year prior to
the commencement of the case constitute two transfers .... Therefore, the trustee herein is
limited to recovery under section 550(a) as against the insider-guarantors only." Id.
76. Id. at 480-81.
77. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1987).
78. See supra note 17 for a list of cases following the majority line of thought.
79. Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 480-81. The non-insider lender is an innocent party because the
lender does not anticipate being subject to the one-year preference period because section
547(b)(4)(B) states that his status should only trigger the ninety-day period. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4)(B). The non-insider lender is thus penalized, by being forced to return the value of
the transfer to the debtor's estate, so that the truly culpable party, the insider-guarantor, is
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even if the payments constituted only one transfer, there still could not
be any recovery from the non-insider creditors because the result would
be inequitable; the party least responsible for rendering the transfer preferential would be the party who would be forced to account for the
transfer.8 0
2.

The district court

The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's holding 81 and instead adopted the minority viewpoint as expressed by Mixon v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc. (In re Big Three Transportation).82 Big Three
Transportationstated that both the two-transfer theory 3 and the equitable argument 4 advanced by the majority school were erroneous in light
of the statute's plain language.8 5 Following the court's approach in Big
Three Transportation, the district court attacked both the bankruptcy
court's determination that one payment could result in two transfers and
its use of equity.8 6
The district court reexamined the nature of "transfer."8 " While the
bankruptcy courts in both Mercon and Deprizio defined the term from a
creditor's point of view,88 the district court reasoned that the Code does
so from the debtor's point of view.89 The court stated that:
The Code says that a transfer occurs when someone "dispos[es]
of or part[s] with property or an interest in property." This
definition clearly looks from the payer's vantage point.... If
Congress had wanted a transfer to occur whenever someone receives a benefit, it could have defined "transfer" as "receiving
or acquiring property or an interest in property."9
punished. See infra note 146-72 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the penalizing effect of extending liability.
80. Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 481. The court felt that "[t]o hold otherwise would make a
guarantee on a debt more of a liability than an asset." Id.
81. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545,
552 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
82. 41 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983); see also Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552.
83. See supranotes 71-74 and accompanying text for discussion of the two-transfer theory.
84. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the equitable argument
advanced by the majority school.
85. Big Three Transp., 41 Bankr. at 20-21.
86. Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 550-53.
87. IdL at 550.
88. Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 551; Mercon, 37 Bankr. at 552. A single transfer to an outside
lender "effected two transfers under the Code, due to the secondary liability of the guarantors." Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 551.
90. Id. (citation omitted).
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In addition to finding that only one transfer had occurred, the district court read section 550 literally, 9 1 finding that it clearly provides an
"either/or" source of recovery. 92 Thus, the trustee could choose to recover from the non-insider lender, as the initial transferee, even though
the non-insider lender does not satisfy the requirements of section
547(b). 93 Lastly, the district court expressed its unwillingness to use
equitable powers in order to tamper with what it perceived to be an un94
ambiguous and comprehensive statutory scheme.

3.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's adoption of the
minority view, stating that "the preference-recovery period for outside
creditors is one year when the payment produces a benefit for an inside
creditor, including a guarantor." 95 If the trustee establishes that insiders
benefited by a transfer to an outsider and thus, are "creditors," 96 then
any such transfer made within one year of the bankruptcy filing is avoidable as a preference and recoverable from the non-insider lenders.

IV.

THE DEPRIZIO DECISION Is LEGALLY CORRECT

A.

No Helpful Legislative History Exists

The majority point of view, as expressed by one court, contended

that:
Section 550(a)(1) was not intended to expand the trustee's right
to recover preferences as provided in [section] 547, but was intended only to facilitate his recovery of transfers avoidable
under [section] 547, regardless of whether the transfer was effected through a number of parties or effected indirectly for the
benefit of the party who actually benefited from the
preference.

98

91. Id. at 551-52; see 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
92. Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 551.
93. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550(a).
94. Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552.
95. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A), (9) (1988). A guarantor is not a "creditor in the colloquial
sense, but under [section] 101(9) of the Code any person with a 'claim' against [the debtor] is a
'creditor,' and anyone with a contingent right to payment holds a 'claim' under [section]
101(4)(A). [Because a] guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the debtor.. ." a
guarantor is a creditor. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190.
97. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200-01.
98. Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982).
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While this court professed to state the Code's "true" intent, scarce evidence exists in the Code's legislative history supporting its claims. 99 In
addition, no clear congressional intention emerges with regard to the relationship between insider-guaranties and the recovery of preferential

transfers." ° In fact, the parties in the Deprizio action agreed that no
helpful legislative history existed.' 0 1

Different inferences can be drawn from the lack of historical references. As in Deprizio, creditors can argue that congressional silence
should be interpreted as preserving the Bankruptcy Act's practice of only
recovering payments from those parties to whom the transfer represented
a preference;" °2 otherwise such a momentous change would have elicited

some type of response.' 3 On the other hand, silence could imply that
Congress simply did not intend the sections' language to operate any less
than literally.'" Both arguments can be supported logically; accordingly, legislative interest in a trustee's ability to recover from both the
non-insider creditor, as well as the insider guarantor, is equivocal at

best. 1o5

B.

The Literal Reading of the Code
1. The meaning of "transfer"

The Deprizio bankruptcy court had attempted to circumvent the
Code's language by finding that one payment created two transfers.10 6
Given the current language of the Code, 0 7 however, the appeals court
was correct in rejecting this two-transfer approach.' 0 8 In the twotransfer approach, "transfers" are equated with the "benefits re99. Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2)(1),
550(a)(1) and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 188 (1985); Pitts, supra note 20, at 347.
100. Pitts, supra note 20, at 344.
101. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Co. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1196 (7th Cir. 1989).
102. Id. at 1196.
103. Id. For a discussion of the recovery practices under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 see
infra text accompanying notes 123-26.
104. See Pitts, supra note 20, at 347.
105. Id. One commentator argues that legislative history is irrelevant in determining Congress' intent regarding recovery under section 550(a)(1). See Note, supra note 20, at 542.
106. See Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr.
478, 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N.
Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 874 F.2d
1186 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon
Indus., Inc.), 37 Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("the single transfer of funds to [the
creditor] effected two transfers under the Code, due to the secondary liability of the
guarantors.").
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
108. The court determined that "[a] single payment ... is one 'transfer', no matter how
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ceived." 1° 9 The Code, however, defines "transfers" as the disposing of or
partingwith property." ° Thus, the Code's definition is from the debtor's
point of view because it focuses on the debtor's relationship with the
property instead of the creditor's relationship. Furthermore, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, it was the legislature's intent
to define "transfer" as broadly as possible."'
While the single transfer approach creates a mix-and-match analysis
to sections 547(b) and 550(a)-one party renders the transfer preferential
while another party pays-that is the fault of the Code's language and
not the court's reasoning." 2 The two-transfer approach"' in Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Industries,
Inc.)" 4 helped remedy this fault, but it did so only by ignoring the plain
language of the statute. As written, it is the payments made which must
be counted, not the benefits received. 5 Because only one transfer occurs
under such a scenario, the fact that an insider-guarantor is involved invokes the one-year preference liability time period of section
many persons gain thereby." Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186,
1196 (7th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 1195; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).
111. See Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 444 (1901). One commentator
argues that only one transfer occurs. See Note, supranote 20, at 535. The commentator states
that two transfers do not occur because the property received must be identical to the property
disposed. Id. In the insider-guarantor scenario, there is no such mutual identity; the debtor
disposes of a tangible payment while the guarantor receives only an extinguishment of a contingent debt. Accordingly, "[Tihere is no separate and independent transfer from the debtor to
the insider guarantor." Id.
While the Note's reasoning is at first appealing, upon closer examination it is shown to be
convoluted. This is because the problem with this argument is that the mutual identity "requirement" does not appear anywhere in the definition of "transfer." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(50).
The definition does not address what must be received. As mentioned above, the definition is
stated entirely from the debtor's point of view. Thus, the definition is conclusive as to the twotransfer theory without the need to resort to this "mutual identity" phrase.
112. Section 550(a)(1) states that both the initial transferee and the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made may be held liable for its recovery. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
Thus, the section envisions that two separate parties could be responsible for a single transfer.
See Nutovic, supra note 20, at 193 for accord.
113. The court in Mercon agrees that the insider-guarantor received a preference. Mercon,
37 Bankr. at 551. However, it states that section 550(a)(1) should not be applied against the
primary creditor who was not liable under section 547(b): "[Section] 550 is not applicable
until the trustee has successfully proven a case under one of the provisions stated therein
[section] 547. Although a case was successfully advanced against the insiders under [section]
547(b), no cause of action against the primary creditor was found." Id. at 552 n.4.
114. 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). See also Note, supra note 20, at 534-36 for a critique of the
"two-transfer" theory based upon the grounds that such a theory is logically inconsistent since
no independent transfer occurs between the debtor and the guarantor.
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547(b)(4)(B), and the transfer is avoidable.116 The first part of the twopart analysis is concluded. The recovery aspect of the analysis then becomes operative.

2. Section 550(a)(1)
Trustees may recover transfers from "the initial transferee of such
transfer or the entityfor whose benefit such transfer was made .... 117
When viewed independently from the factual scenario at hand, this lan-

guage leaves little doubt that trustees may choose from whom they can
recover. The Deprizio bankruptcy court, however, ignored this clear language. It concluded "that section 550(a)(1) was not intended to expand

the trustee's right to recover preferential transfers under section 547 but
rather was intended merely to facilitate recovery of those transfers which

are avoidable.... To hold otherwise would make a guarantee on a debt
more of a liability than an asset." 1 ' Yet, there is no legislative history to
support this conclusion. As one commentator has stated:
[A]s hard as one searches, one is unable to uncover any material evidence in the Code or the legislative history that Con-

gress intended paragraph 550(a)(1) to operate less than literally
merely because [only] one of the potential defendants designated in that paragraph supplies the factual predicate for avoiding a transfer.1 1 9
While the bankruptcy court's advocacy of policy is commendable, both
the district court and the Seventh Circuit commented that the trial court
should be faulted for its manipulation of the clear language of section

550(a)(1).

1 20

116. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (emphasis added).
118. Deprizio, 58 Bankr. at 481; accord Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19
Bankr. 843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
119. Pitts, supra note 20, at 347.
120. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195-96; Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N.
Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545, 551 (N.D. Il. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). Pitts further supports the literal reading of section 550(a)(1) because he feels that it promotes the essential purpose of the insider preference provision. See
Pitts, supra note 20, at 353. For a criticism of the assumption that extending liability to the
non-insider creditor will address these policy concerns, see infra notes 146-68 and accompanyig text.
A unique but logically impractical response to the court's use of section 550(a)(1) has
been advanced by one commentator. See Note, supra note 20. The author of that Note states
that, while the words of section 550(a)(1) are clear when read in isolation from sections 547
and 550(a)(2), they become ambiguous when read in conjunction with each other. Id. at 54041. This reasoning is flawed from the outset; section 550(a)(1) and (a)(2) must be read to avoid
any contradiction in terms. 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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The Inapplicabilityof Pre-Code Practice

A majority of courts addressing the issue of extended liability have
advanced the argument that, in the absence of legislative history, courts
should follow the pre-Code practice of allowing the trustee to recover
only from the party whose status rendered the transfer avoidable as a
preference.12 1 However, with regard to the connection between sections
547(b) and 550 and the resulting extended liability to non-insider creditors, the pre-Code practice is of little use. 122
The Deprizio scenario arises because there is no doubt that the guarantor, as a creditor with a contingent claim against the debtor, is bene1 23
Some
fited whenever a payment is made to the non-insider lender.

doubt existed as to the characterization of a guarantor as a creditor
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act).1 24 However, an argument
that pre-Code practice is helpful for determining legislative intent still
could be advanced. From past practice, Congress must have intended to
allow recovery only from the creditor whose status rendered the preference voidable. 125 Recognizing the Act's separation into two sections of

preference liability and recovery power, one commentator acknowledges
the argument: preference liability would be disallowed if the require-

ments of the preference subsection, 57g, were not satisfied; because of the
possibility of disallowance, the 1903 amendment to subsection 57g in-

sured that where a creditor's claim was disallowed, a trustee was unable
only from
to recover from the recipient; rather, recovery was permitted
26
the creditor against whom the transfer was voidable.1
§ 53.01, at 549 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). Because the two sections use different words to describe
the class of transferee they refer to, they should be read to refer exclusively to those separate
classes. Subsection (a)(1) addresses the initial transferee, meaning the party whofirst receives
the transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1). The outside lender, having directly received the transfer, can only logically be designated as this party.
121. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
122. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550 (1988).
123. See supra note 96.
124. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1988)). The Act's definition of creditor contained an element of provability.
"[1]n defining a 'creditor' and a 'debt,' sections 1(11) and 1(14) of the Act imported the concept of provability." See Pitts, supra note 20, at 345 n.17. However, the contingent nature of
the insider guarantor's reimbursement claim possibly did not support the required provability
element, thus preventing a characterization of the insider as a creditor. Id.
125. Pitts, supra note 20, at 352.
126. Id.
(1) By the terms of subsection 57g since 1903, Bank's claim against Debtor
would not be disallowed because although Bank received "technical" preferences, it
did not receive "voidable" preferences as that provision requires;
(2) The 1903 amendment to subsection 57g was designed to insure a perfect
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As the commentator notes, however, the use of this pre-Code argument today would involve convoluted reasoning because it requires the

belief that the Code is an extension of prior law rather than an avulsion.

Only by holding such a belief could it be said that this historical

perspective continues to be indicative of the intent of Congress under the
new regime.1 2 8 Rather, as expressed accurately by the Seventh Circuit,

"When Congress makes wholesale changes in the text and structure of
the law, it is fatuous to pretend that a silent legislative history means that
1 29
existing practices should continue unchanged."
D.

The Equitable Argument Is Not Compelling

Confronted with an inequitable result due to the literal application
of section 550(a), courts in the majority line of opinions 3 ° heed Collier's
advice that where a trustee demands recovery from a party whose status

did not supply the required predicate for avoidance, "the bankruptcy
court should exercise its discretion to use its equitable powers under sec-

tion 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. [section] 1481 to prevent [the] inequitable result."' 31 By utilizing equitable arguments, these cases exemplify a resultoriented approach towards the insider-guarantor situation. 132 These
courts look with disfavor upon the possibility that a prudent creditor
who obtained a guaranty would be worse off than a creditor who had
correspondence between disallowance under that subsection and recoverability under
subsection 60b;
(3) To permit the recovery of these transfers from Bank would introduce in
reverse the disuniformity between subsection 57g and 60b by permitting recovery
under subsection 60b from a creditor whose claim would have been allowed under
subsection 57g even if he did not surrender the transfers; ERGO
(4) Property shall be recoverable under subsection 60b only from the creditor
whose "reasonable cause to believe" makes the preference voidable.
Id.
127. Id. at 353.
128. Id.
129. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1196 (7th Cir. 1989).
See Note, supra note 20, at 542 for a contrary interpretation of congressional silence. "Since
Congress did not indicate any intent to change this interpretation of the existing law in the
legislative history of the Code, it is likely that it intended no change." Id.
130. See supra note 17, for a list of cases which follow the majority point of view.
131. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 77,

550.02, at 550-6 to -7.

132. See, eg., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc. (In re Midwestern Co.), 102
Bankr. 169, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (time limit for insiders cannot be applied to non-insiders); In
re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (even if debtor's transfer is
preferential for purposes of section 547(b), court will not punish creditor for prudence in obtaining guaranty); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 894
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983) (creditor should not be penalized for prudence in seeking guarantor of
debt).
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13 3

13
The court in Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.) 1

justified its result-oriented stance by concluding that no statutory lan-

guage compelled it to render a literal application of section 550(a)(1). 13 5
This conclusion appears to be wrong. As Justice White said in Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,136 "[W]hatever equitable powers remain in
the bankruptcy court must and can only be exercised within the confines

of the Bankruptcy Code." 13' 7 In subsequent bankruptcy cases, courts
have interpreted "equitable powers" to include the court's ability to give

an equitable interpretation to an unclear statute.1 38 In the Deprizio situation, the statute's language is clear; 13 9 hence, as bankruptcy law is now
written under the Code, equity has no place."
V.

DEPRizio's POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS ARE INCORRECT

The Deprizio court's analysis of the current bankruptcy law is correct. 14 1 The result of the analysis, however, is contrary to general equity
considerations and specific preference policy.14 2 This Comment seeks to

expose the Seventh Circuit's inadequate response to creditors' arguments
against extended liability and illustrate the reasons why their arguments
are valid. 14 3 The court professes to address a wide-range of concerns,

such as: policy objectives, impact on business costs, business practices,
remedy opportunities and codified exceptions. 1"

The Deprizio court

however approaches the issue of extended liability without considering
133. See Midwestern Co., 102 Bankr. at 173; Aerco Metals, 60 Bankr. at 82; R.A. Beck
Builder, 34 Bankr. at 894.
134. 34 Bankr. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
135. Id. at 894.
136. 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
137. Id. at 206. But see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (cited with
approval in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986)). The court stated that it does not "read
these statutory words [in the former Bankruptcy Act] with the ease of a computer. There is an
overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id.
138. See Edson v. Wisconsin Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Edson), 86 Bankr. 141, 144 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1988); In re Charterhouse, Inc., 84 Bankr. 147, 154 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
139. See supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
140. The use of equity to avoid strict construction of statutes is limited and does not support "result-oriented" rereading of section 550(a) as the majority view has done. Lowrey v.
First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling), 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd sub
nom. Manufacturer Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling), 892
F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
141. See supra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 169-231 and accompanying text.
144. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
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the implication its ruling would have outside the bankruptcy arena.145
A. Argument One: Insiders Pose Special Problems, and Extended
Liability Helps Solve Them
The Bankruptcy Code seeks to ensure that the debtor's asset "pie" is

kept whole until it is judicially sliced for a supervised distribution to the
creditors.'" A collective process of claim payments was adopted in order to prevent creditors from indulging in individually advantageous maneuvers. 14 7 Preference avoidance, in particular, is a creditor misbehavior

rule.'48 It is directed at preventing a creditor from taking advantage of
its relationship with the debtor 49 by either collaborating with the
debtor51 ° or forcing the debtor to alter the creditor's existing position vis-

a-vis other creditors in anticipation of the debtor's insolvency. 51 Accordingly, the Code's preference section 547 is concerned with the
amount of control a party has over the debtor. 5 2 The Deprizio court
reasons that extended liability will effectively constrain creditors who

wrongly wish to control the debtor."'
The court's reasoning is at first very persuasive. It is based on the
assumption that insiders have special knowledge of the debtor's financial

position and management operations, and hence, will first recognize the
debtor's descent into bankruptcy.'54 Having given personal guaranties,
145. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor'sBargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 907 (1982).
Bankruptcy law has, for too long, been molded and interpreted without any systematic questioning or understanding of its nominative role in a larger legal, economic,
and social world .... [W]e would be better able to formulate and apply principled
bankruptcy rules if we would give systematic and critical attention to the impact of
those rules on non-bankruptcy entitlements.
Id.
146. Jackson, supra note 3, at 728-30.
147. Id. at 763. This scheme is premised on the notion that rational creditors would privately agree to such a distribution system if they were to bargain together prior to the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 728.
148. Id at 759; see also T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 126
(1986).
149. Jackson, supra note 3, at 759.
150. Id; see also T. JACKSON, supra note 148, at 122-28.
151. Jackson, supra note 3, at 759.
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
153. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989).
154. Jackson, supra note 3, at 759; see also T. JACKSON, supra note 148, at 122-28. The
Code's definition of insider, however, does not require the element of knowledge. See supra
note 12. Hence it is not impossible to hypothesize about an insider who does not have any
special insight, such as a relative. Accordingly, the Depriziocourt's entire argument rests upon
the over-inclusive statement that "[all i]nsiders will be the first to recognize that the firm is in a
downward spiral." Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195.
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insiders will be interested in reducing their own liability. The court reasons that insiders will accomplish this self-serving goal by using their
special knowledge of the debtor's financial condition. 155 The results will
be a concealment of the debtor's true financial picture and an opportunity for the insiders to make out "like bandits." 156 However, the court's
argument fails when, in a giant leap of logic, it concludes that by extending the preference liability period of outside creditors who hold insider guaranties, these results will be forestalled.1 57
The major problem with this reasoning is the court's focus on the

lone insider. Preference liability is justified by the policy of preventing
the creditor from altering its position either by collaboration or coercion.15 8 Thus, the policy assumes that the creditor has taken an active
role in dipping into the "pie". The Code provides for this presumption by
establishing different preference liability time periods for insiders and

outsiders.159 Because the insider's threat is proportionately larger than
that of a non-insider, a longer period has been assigned to it."6 It, argua-

bly, is inequitable to lengthen the outsider's liability period without a
threat to the distribution of the
further demonstration that the outsider's
1 61

"pie" has correspondingly increased.

A focus on the creditor's knowledge, however, can create numerous
problems because the door would then be open to a factual inquiry in
every case. Congress' systematic elimination of the "reasonable cause to
believe" requirement from the Code's preference section 162 evidences its
155. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195.
156. Id. The court focuses on the overall policy to discourage individually advantageous
maneuvers among the creditors. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 758-59.
157. See Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195. "[A]n extended recovery period for payments to
outside creditors that benefit insiders could contribute to the ability of the bankruptcy process
to deter last-minute grabs of assets." Id.
158. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 759-60.
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), (B).
160. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195.
161. Should the court really be concerned that the outside lender is attempting personally
to control the debtor by "pulling the strings" of the insider-guarantor, the court has an alternative recourse-equitable subordination under section 510. This principle states that all or part
of a creditor's claim may be subordinated to other claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 10(c)(1) (1988).
See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) for the scope and general applicability of the
principle of equitable subordination.
162. Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988)) with Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(b)(2), 98 Stat. 378 (1984)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988)) (the requirement was retained for insider creditors in the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments). The piecemeal elimination of the requirement
suggests both the concern that the longer liability period for insiders should only apply to
those creditors guilty of manipulation, and the realism that "reasonable cause" is extremely
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will to dispense with such case by case investigation.16 3 Accordingly, the
Deprizio court was confronted with either the difficult and frowned-upon
task of attempting to ascertain the creditor's knowledge, or the inequitable assumption that collusion had occurred.
The Deprizio court, however, made reference to neither the outside
creditor's own intentional maneuvering nor the creditor's awareness of
the insider's activities in any context. Instead, the court simply punished
the outsider in order to punish its primary target, the insider-manipulator. Its justification-that inequity does not occur because the outsiders
will maintain their contractual entitlementsl 1 -- is insufficient to support
the result.
The court stated that two separate liability time periods are needed
to prevent a chain reaction of grabs led by the insider. 6 By making the
preference-recovery period for insiders longer than that for outsiders, the
court reasoned that it would be less costly to prevent grabs than if the
period were the same. 66 Yet, when confronted by guaranties, as opposed to general loan situations, the court contradicted itself with no further explanation than that an "extended recovery period for payments to
outside creditors that benefit insiders could contribute to the ability of
the bankruptcy process to deter last-minute grabs of assets." 167 A mere
possibility of heightened deterrence is inadequate to support the creation
of a situation which enables "a creditor who does not demand a guarantor [to] be better off than one who does." 168
B. Argument Two: The Market Theory that Prices Will Adjust
The Practicing Law Institute came to the same conclusion that a
creditor should not be punished merely for obtaining a guaranty. The
Institute stated that:
The majority view is arguably the better result. To hold otherwise would place creditors in a difficult position of having to
choose between i) not taking a guarantee and risking nonpaydifficult to prove. The desire to increase the rule-oriented function of preference law, however,
won. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 765-66 n. 119.
163. Sections of the Code are designed to promote "bright line rules" rather than case-bycase analysis in order to be "'consistent with the Code's policy of reducing litigation over
difficult questions of fact .... .'" Jackson, supra note 3, at 775 & n.158 (quoting Harris, A
Reply to Theodore Eisenberg'sBankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327, 34045
(1982)).
164. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1195.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCy, supra note 77, %550.02, at 550-8 (footnote omitted).
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ment or ii) taking a guarantee and risking that the payments
made by the debtor will be recoverable under [section] 550(a),
risks that should not have to be borne by a creditor.16 9
The Deprizio court, on the other hand, claimed that the risks of nonpayment or an extended preference liability time period rightfully belong
to the non-insider creditor.17 0 Addressing the lenders' concerns that the
result of extending liability is inequitable, the court harshly answered
that once a rule is known, loan prices will adjust. 17 1 "A rule may injure
debtors and creditors by foreclosing efficient business arrangements and
increasing the rate of interest low-risk borrowers must pay,... but inefficiency is not inequity."' 172 The point raised is whether bankruptcy rules
should be allowed to have such a binding and unsettling impact upon
business practices. From a common sense approach, courts should not
adhere to an inefficient rule merely because it is not "inequitable" in the
purest sense of the word.
The court should have been concerned with the effect its holding
would have on the fine balance which existed between the desire to give
corporations fresh starts 173 and the cost to the economy of achieving
them. The Code, in general, made filing bankruptcy petitions more attractive for debtors.' 74 By extending the preference liability time period
for outside lenders holding inside guaranties, the court makes bankruptcy filings even more appealing. "From an economic standpoint, it
therefore raise[s] the cost of bankruptcy to creditors and future borrowers, who pay for higher default rates in the form of higher interest
charges."' 175 At some point, the rates could be so high that borrowers
will be less able to pay and lenders less willing to lend. 176 Thus, a serious
question arises as to the reasonableness of having bankruptcy courts determine such potentially far-reaching economic policies.' 77
169. Rosenberg, Smith & Iten, Avoidance ofPreferencesand FraudulentTransfers; Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENT FOR WORKOUT OFFICERS AND
LENDERS COUNSEL 431, 465 (Practicing Law Institute, Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook No. 507, 1989).
170. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1197 (7th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 1198.
172. Id.
173. Through a Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan, it is hoped that corporations can achieve
health and fitness, and once again be able to contribute to the economy. See White, Personal
Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An EconomicAnalysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1987)
[hereinafter White, PersonalBankruptcy].
174. Id. at 2-3.
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Judge Easterbrook has rendered other opinions which inspire conservative lending
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C. Argument Three: The Effect on Workouts Is Not Detrimental

In addition to determining that extended liability is not inequitable,
the Deprizio court believed that this would not have a negative impact on

business practices. 171 It stated that "[w]orkouts often involve guarantees, and if these mean longer preference periods, then workouts may
become less common (and formal bankruptcy more common). It is not
clear to us that bankruptcy proceedings are more costly than
179
workouts."
The court shrugs at the often devastating social consequences of

bankruptcy by stating that "[i]t's not as though filing of a bankruptcy
petition closes the firm and heaves its workers into the streets."1

0

One

need only read about the widespread effect that the bankruptcy of Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc. is having not only on the stock brokerage indus-

try but on law firms and other business enterprises as well,
to realize that
1 81

the court's statement is callous if not outright incorrect.
Bankruptcies have tangible costs.18 2 The Deprizio court states that
the parties are as free to negotiate in bankruptcy as they are outside
practices. See In re Ebler Furniture & Appliances, Inc., 804 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
178. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
179. Id. at 1198. One commentator appears to support Judge Easterbrook's statement.
White, The Behavior ofFirms in FinancialDistress: Bankruptcy Costs andthe New Bankruptcy
Code, 38 J. FIN. 477 (1983) [hereinafter White, Bankruptcy Costs]. Her premise is that the
Code increases economic efficiency which is defined as a decrease in aggregate bankruptcy
costs. Id. at 478. However, this premise is based upon the conclusion that bankruptcy costs
have decreased only because relativelyfewer firms are reorganizingunder the Code as opposed
to the numbers which had filed under the Bankruptcy Act. Id at 486. Judge Easterbrook,
however, projected an increase in the number of reorganizations in bankruptcy. Deprizio, 874
F.2d at 1198. If one assumes that Easterbrook is correct, then White's premise loses its necessary predicate and is rendered faulty. Perhaps the most damaging rebuttal to White's article is
her own statement that "the estimates suggest strongly that bankruptcy costs are higher than
has previously been thought and that further research and rethinking is needed in this area."
White, Bankruptcy Costs, supra, at 487.
180. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
181. Fanning, Branded by Drexel, and Still Out of Work, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1990, § 3,
at 29, col. 1.
182. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1987, at 3, 7.
Judge Easterbrook contends that economic theory is a helpful way to think about
legal questions.... In order to know[, however,] whether judges use too much or too
little economic theory in judicial decisionmaking, judges must decide what the goals
of their decisionmaking are. If those goals are broader than simply maximizing economic efficiency or wealth maximization, then the Easterbrook prescription is not
helpful enough to judges because it does not provide a blueprint for knowing when to
use economics.
Culp, Forward: Economists on the Bench, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. Autumn 1987, at 1,
10.
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bankruptcy."8 3 Corporate bankruptcy, however, is an elaborate set of
rules and regulations which are precisely designed to inhibit the parties'
ability to freely negotiate for disbursement of the debtor's assets or alterations in management."8 4
Outside bankruptcy, parties are free to entertain takeover bids and
indulge in "creative" financing in order to maximize shareholders' worth
and corporate efficiency. 8 5 An owner of a share of stock may use or
transfer it as the owner pleases.'1 6 Most importantly, under general corporate law, nothing prevents shareholders from contractually pledging
their entire net worth to insure that claims are satisfied.'" 7 As one
scholar has stated, "[i]ndeed, in the case of closely held corporations,
individual guarantees of key officers and shareholders make such contracts the rule rather than the exception."'
While bankruptcy reorganization could be viewed as simply a different kind of collective proceeding in which non-bankruptcy rights are
shifted and reallocated, the traditional view is strikingly different. 8 9 The
benefit of the bargain is undercut; the rules exist in order to provide
breathing space for the troubled corporation and not to implement the
investor's bargain. 90 By further affecting the investor's bargain,
Deprizio's application of extended liability adds a burdensome weight to
loan negotiations. It appears to support the saying that "when the rules
of the.., game become more complicated, the advantages of playing the
game decline."'' Losses due to bankruptcies are borne not only by
other borrowers in the form of higher interest rates but also by lenders in
the form of lost equity.' 92 These losses increase the cost of risk-taking,
1 93
which in turn, cause lenders to reduce their willingness to lend.
While the Deprizio court was correct from a legal standpoint to
183. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
184. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 729. "[B]ankruptcy exists at its core to maximize the
value of assets in the face of individualized pressures to ignore the collective weal for individual
gain." Id. In order to achieve this goal, the Bankruptcy Code imposes a scheme to prevent
individuals from enjoying rights normally held outside the bankruptcy framework. See id. at
727-31.
185. See Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the NationalEconomy, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 467, 469.
186. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor CorporateReorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128-

29 (1986).
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Macey, supra note 185, at 474.
White, PersonalBankruptcy, supra note 173, at 2.
Id.
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reject the influence of hampered workouts on the ordinary reading of
section 550(a)(1), that influence must be computed from a policy standpoint. 94 It has been suggested that:
most debtors and their creditors would and should prefer to
work out their problems in a non-bankruptcy setting. Given
this preference, bankruptcy rules are often more important
outside bankruptcy than in a bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy law, like other law, plays an important role whether or
not it is formally applicable. During negotiations outside bankruptcy, perceptions about bankruptcy substantially influence
the parties' positions and bargaining strengths. 19
D. Argument Four: The ProperRemedy Is Against the Insider
Guarantor
The Deprizio court asked: "In what sense is it 'inequitable' to require the outside lenders to pursue the inside guarantors for any shortfall
... ?196 It is inequitable because in most cases, the insider will be bankrupt,1 97 thus leaving the outside creditor with no recourse whatsoever.
While the outsiders did indeed bargain for the guaranty, and hence
chanced the possibility that the guarantor may declare bankruptcy, they
did not bargain for the compound effect of guarantor bankruptcy and
their own extended liability.
By the end of 1982, the average repayment of liabilities owed by
persons filing bankruptcy was approximately one-half of one cent on the
dollar.1 98 This rough estimate translates into an annual loss to lenders of
fifteen billion dollars per year.1 99 The loss can be attributed, at least in
part, to the fact that a paramount consideration--enabling the debtor to
make a fresh start-has made bankruptcy attractive to debtors. 2°°
"[T]here is a high probability of creditors not receiving any payments at
all, as well as a high probability of extremely low average payoff rates
even when a positive payment is made .
",201 There is little support
for the court's statement that the outside creditor could find equity by
resorting to a claim against the guarantor.
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
195. Culp, supra note 182, at 3.
196. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
197. See White, PersonalBankruptcy, supra note 173, at 1-2.
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id. at 1-2.
200. Id. at 2-3. From 1980 to 1981, there was a 43% increase in the number of personal
bankruptcies. Id. at 29-30.
201. Id. at 39.
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Argument Five: The CreditorMust Have Been Made Better Offfor

There to Be a Problem
The creditor does not find solace in the fact that section 547(b) has
several elements which must be met before a transfer is considered preferential and, thus, avoidable. 2 2 The section includes the requirement
that creditors receive more than they would have had there been a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor and the preferential transfer not been
made. 203 The court claims that "the tales of woe presented by the
[outside] creditors" are exaggerated in light of this "better off" requirement. 2" If the outside creditor is over-secured without the guaranty,
then there is no risk in obtaining a guaranty. The insider guarantor will
never face liability and, hence, while still a contingent creditor of the
debtor, the guarantor is not made better off from any payment to the

outsider. While this is true, creditors nonetheless face a host of predicaments in which the "better off" requirement will present a very weak
shield.
1.

The extent of voidability

The Deprizio court discounted the concerns expressed by the outside
lenders regarding an extended liability period precisely because of the
existence of the "better off" requirement.20 5 It stated that the impact of
extended liability will be.far less than charged in light of the "fact" that
section 547(b)(5) renders a transfer preferential "only to the extent [that]

the creditor got more than it would have received in a liquidation .
This may have been true ifonly the Code providedfor this limitation on the extent of voidability. The truth of the matter, however, is that
no such limitation exists.
*..,20

6

As with other statutory constructions, subsection (b)(5) should be
read in conjunction with the other subsections of section 547(b) so that a
total effect is given to the entire provision. 2° The preamble of subsection

202. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). See supra note 3 for section 547(b) requirements.
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5). The other requirements include (1) a transfer; (2) of an
interest of the debtor in property; (3) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (4) for or on account of
an antecedent debt owed by the debtor; (5) made while the debtor was insolvent; (6) made
within a specified period of time. Id. § 547(b).
204. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1989);
see id. § 547(b)(5).
205. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1199-1200.
206. Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).
207. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b). Legislation is neither written, read, nor applied in a vacuum.
See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 120, § 53.01, at 549 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). Rather, each new act
becomes a component in an interwoven system of written laws, whose essence encompasses an
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(b) allows for the avoidance of any transfer should five requirements be
met: (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor, (2) for or on account of an
antecedent debt, (3) made while the debtor was insolvent, (4) on or
within 90 days before bankruptcy unless the creditor is an "insider" in
which case the time period is one year before bankruptcy, and (5) the
creditor receives more than it would receive in a Chapter 7 had the transfer not been made.2 08 The "to the extent" language referred to by the
court merely constitutes the last step which must be satisfied in order to
avoid the entire transfer.2 0 9
Once a court determines that the creditor received more than it
would have under a Chapter 7 liquidation, the entire transfer is avoided.
The trustee can then recover the value of the transfer for the benefit of
the estate and the creditors as a collective group.2 10 While the preferred
creditor's claim is not extinguished, it must now wait in line with the rest
of the creditors for the disbursement of estate funds. Avoidance of the
entire preferential transfer is the only reading of section 547(b) which
furthers the general bankruptcy goal of equitably distributing the
debtor's assets among all the creditors.2"
The district court's reading of section 547(b) would not achieve the
same policy objective. Should the transfers only be avoided to the extent
that the creditor was made better off, the estate would be recovering only
a fraction of the amount the debtor had disbursed immediately prior to
bankruptcy. The trustee's efforts to equally distribute the assets to the
awaiting creditors would be highly frustrated. The creditor in question
would not have to suffer the lengthy process of judicial inquiry and approval of the reorganization plan. Furthermore, the creditor would be
assured of at least a partial recovery. Accordingly, the creditor would
remain "preferred," and the Code's goal of equitable distribution would
have been placed in jeopardy.
The Deprizio interpretation of section 547(b) may give the illusion of
properly easing creditors' fears. In response to a hypothetical situation
posed by creditors-that upon payment a creditor may extinguish his
security interest, thus finding himself unsecured when it is subsequently
assumption of consistency. Id. "[C]ourts have been said to be under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done." Id. at 550 (footnote omitted).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
209. CompareDeprizio, 874 F.2d at 1199 with 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (court seemingly isolates
phrase "to the extent" from rest of section, thus giving phrase more weight than is warranted).
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
211. Seligson, supra note 2, at 292.
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avoided2 1 2-the court implied that the predicament is not that severe.2 13
Should the security interest have covered ninety percent of the debt,
"then only the remaining [ten percent] of the payment is avoidable as a
preference.

214

Having illustrated the error in the court's reasoning, the hypothetical now becomes more troubling. Under the correct interpretation of
section 547(b), the entire transfer should be avoided and the creditor
would be completely unsecured.21 5 The effect of this situation is to force
creditors to retain the security interest for an entire year in order to protect themselves from a Deprizio-type attack. Security interests would not
be extinguished, and the debtor's property would continue to be encumbered. This could affect the debtor's attempt to obtain subsequent loans,
in that future creditors either would not lend at all, or lend in limited
amounts because of the encumbrance. A troubled debtor could thus be
pushed into bankruptcy faster and more surely than had creditors not
faced the possibility of extended liability.
2.

The problem of valuation

The existence of different valuation systems illustrates the complexity of ascertaining the real value of security interests. It is feasible that
under various valuation systems, an outside creditor could be shown to
be under-, not over-secured. Creditors could find themselves facing preference liability because a court, using hindsight, employs a different valuation system than they did. 2 16 Thus, they could be confronted with
having been made better off, satisfying the last step of section 547(b) and
rendering the transfer voidable. This threat will encourage lenders to
obtain very conservative loan-to-value ratios.21 7 By tightening lending
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
In another opinion, Judge Easterbrook also sought to encourage conservative lending

by decreeing that a wholesale value be used for inventory analysis for purposes of the section

547(c)(5) preferential exception. See In re Ebler Furniture & Appliances, Inc., 804 F.2d 87,
92-93 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). However, another line of valuation was
presented in In re Xonics Photochemical,Inc, for determining reasonably equivalent value in
fraudulent conveyance actions. 841 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1988); see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)
(1988). In those situations, the guaranty must be discounted by the probability that it would
have been called upon in order to determine its value. Xonics, 841 F.2d. at 200. Different
valuation systems could likewise be employed in preferences, perhaps harming the creditor.
217. A loan ratio is defined as: "The ratio expresses as a percentage of the amount of a loan
to the value or selling price of real property. Usually, the higher the percentage, the greater
the interest charged." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845 (5th ed. 1979).
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practices, debtors will face more difficulty in obtaining loans and could
face a greater likelihood of failing.
F.

Argument Six: The Application of the Extended Liability Time
Period Is Narrow
The Deprizio court attempted to describe the parameters of extended
liability by answering a hypothetical problem advanced by the lenders. 2 18
The hypothetical prophesied that outside creditors could be placed in a
Deprizio situation, regardless of their own secured position, if at any time
subsequent creditors are under-secured, granted security interests in the
same collateral, and receive guaranties from insiders. The court stated
that "we have substantial doubt that the payments to Lender [number
one] are avoidable transfers. By assumption Lender [number one] is
over-secured, so its position has not been improved relative to a Chapter
7 liquidation, [section] 547(b)(5). ' ' 2 19 This conclusion, while it would
seemingly appease some worried lenders, is premised upon faulty logic;
hence, the worry remains.
The district opinion stated that the trustee would have "an uphill
battle" to win such an argument.2 20 In truth, under the correct reasoning of section 547(b)-as espoused by the Deprizio case-there may not
even be a fight. 21 Liability is extended because the inside guarantorreceives a benefit from the transfer to the outsider, thus invoking the one
year reach-back period under section 547(b)(4)(B).2 22 In the hypothetical situation the court focuses on whether or not the outsider received
any benefit. 23 The lender's benefit, however, is irrelevant under the
court's own previous analysis.2 24 Under the Deprizio analysis, it does not
matter whether "Lender number one" or "Lender number ten" receives
the guaranty, because the court's focus will always be on the insiderguarantor as the party who is benefited. Accordingly, the court does little to confine the implications of its opinion.
G.

Argument Seven: The Lender Always Has the Exception
of Section 547(c)(2)

In addition to suggesting that lenders could find refuge from the
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
15 and
223.
224.

See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989).
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200.
Id.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988). For a more detailed description, see supra notes 106accompanying text.
Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200.
See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
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effects of extended liability in the "better off" requirement22 5 in its "narrow" application,2 2 6 the Deprizio court stated that protection from the
extended liability time period exists in the "ordinary course of business"
exception. 227 According to the court, as long as the payments were being
228
paid on time, the lender would qualify for the preference exception.
Section 547(c)(2) was "designed to encourage creditors to deal with a
failing business and to protect ordinary business transactions" by
preventing the onset of bankruptcy.2 29 While preventing avoidability
may be the goal of the exception, section 547(c)(2) limits the creditors to
the same business practices which have already been proven to be ineffective in preventing the debtor's slide into bankruptcy. 230 The Code requires that the transfer be ordinarily conceived and transacted not only
as between the particular debtor and creditor but also within the industry
as a whole. 231 Accordingly, the exception does not encompass any sort
of creative refinancing or new management procedures which could actually be of assistance in reorganizing the debtor prior to bankruptcy.
Therefore, subsection (c)(2) does not afford the non-inside lender, who
possesses an insider-guaranty, the type and extent of protection the court
has suggested.
VI.

SOLuTIONs Do NOT EXIST OUTSIDE AN AMENDMENT

A.

Drafting Creates Its Own Problems

Some commentators, as well as the Deprizio court, have suggested
that a Deprizio extended liability period could be avoided if the insiderguarantor waived all rights to indemnification from the debtor.23 2 Be225. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1989).
See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) for statutory language of "better off" requirement.
226. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200.
227. Id. at 1199-1200. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) for "ordinary course of business"
exception.
228. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1200.
229. Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.), 43 Bankr. 871, 876
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
230. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). Section 547(c)(2) will except an otherwise preferential
transfer to the extent that it was:
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms[.]

Id.
231. See id.
232. See Pitts, supra note 20, at 355; Katzen, supra note 20, at 529-3 1. The Deprizio opinion also suggests this recourse with its emphasis on the characterization of the insiders as
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cause of the waiver, the insider would no longer have a claim against the
debtor, the insider's status as a creditor would be nullified, and a neces-

sary predicate of section 547 could not be satisfied, thereby preventing
the extended reach-back period.2 33
There are several problems, however, with relying on contractual

waivers as a solution. First, guarantors may often be reluctant to waive
their rights to indemnification.234 Second, courts could interpret such

waivers as an inequitable means of avoiding legal responsibility. They
could invoke their equitable powers, 235 and deem the insider-guarantors

creditors of the debtor notwithstanding the "waiver." The waiver theory
would therefore fail, and lenders would be liable for the extended time
period. Third, waivers could directly encourage the insiders to prefer

one creditor over another, which is the very action the extended liability
time period was designed to avoid.2 36 Removal of all recourse for the

guarantors would motivate them to ensure that the debtor pays off the
lender, thereby reducing the guarantors' potential liability. Further-

more, waivers could support the notion that lenders had either exercised
control over or conspired with the insiders.23 7 The lenders could be con-

sidered insiders and independently fulfill the requirement for the oneyear liability period.238
In addition, such waivers could potentially create a fraudulent conveyance situation. When no "equivalent value" has been given in exchange for the transfer, that transfer can be adjudged fraudulent.2 39
Thus, even if the lender is able to surmount the problems mentioned
"creditors" within its analysis of the tax and pension plan liabilities issues. Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186, 1191-94 (7th Cir. 1989). "A person is a 'creditor'
only to the extent he holds a 'claim' against the debtor." Accordingly, all turns on whether a
"person... has a contingent right to recover from the debtor in bankruptcy, the only basisfor
calling him a 'creditor'." Id. at 1191 (emphasis added).
233. Katzen, supra note 20, at 529; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
234. Katzen, supra note 20, at 530.
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
236. See supra notes 147-50, 158 and accompanying text.
237. Waivers may be obtained through bargaining and negotiations. Accordingly, should
insiders consent to waiving their rights to indemnification from the debtor in order to obtain
loans from outside creditors, it could appear that the outside creditors used coercion or control
over the debtor. In this manner, the outside creditors could be considered insiders.
238. See Katzen, supra note 20, at 531.
239. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). In addition to "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any entity," a fraudulent transfer is created when the debtor receives "less than reasonably
equivalent value" and is rendered "insolvent," left with "unreasonably small capital," or has
"debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay." Id. § 548(a)(1), (2)(A),
(2)(B)(i),(ii),(iii). Within the Ninth Circuit especially, there is the unanswered question as to
what exactly constitutes "reasonably equivalent value." See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
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24 1
It
above, 2" the transfer could be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance.
would not be difficult for the trustee, and the bankruptcy court, to doubt
that the waiver was exchanged for equivalent value. Therefore, the insider may not only be liable for a loan to another entity, but after the
waiver, the insider may have given up all possible means of recourse if
called upon to perform on the guaranty. It may be argued that by giving
the guaranty, the insider receives an indirect benefit: if the debtor prospers because of the loan, so will the insider. However, this argument is
not acceptable if this indirect benefit is all the insider will ever receive.

B.

The Outsider-CreditorIs Not a Mere Conduit

Drafting a waiver cannot solve the Deprizio problem, nor can recharacterizing the lender as a "mere conduit." Lenders have used the
"mere conduit" label as a successful defense to preference liability.2 4 2 In
24
Bonded FinancialServices v. EuropeanAmerican Bank, the trustee was
prohibited from recovering from a bank because the bank was not the
initial transferee under section 550(a)(1). 2" In the Bonded Financial
opinion, Judge Easterbrook relied on the bank's total absence of dominion and control over the applicable transfer concluding that the bank was
a "mere conduit.""24 The bank was adjudged to be a subsequent transferee2 46 entitled to a good faith defense.2 47
A recent article advocates extending this notion of "mere conduit"
to "include any initial recipient whose relationship to a transaction is not
logically linked to the elements that allow the trustee to avoid the transfer."'2 48 "Fortuitous recipients, ' 249 such as outside lenders in a Deprizio

situation, would be relieved of their "initial transferee" status. Absent
proof of control over the insider, the logical link between the outside
1984); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 Bankr. 983, 986 (Bankr. S.D. Ca.
1989).
240. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
241. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
242. Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir. 1988).
243. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
244. Id. at 893; see 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
245. Bonded Fin., 838 F.2d at 893-94. "Ihe minimum requirement.., is dominion over
the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one's own purposes. When A gives a
check to B as agent for C, then C is the 'initial transferee'; the agent may be disregarded." Id.
The term "mere conduit" was utilized by the district court, which had granted the bank summary judgment without explicitly discussing section 550. Id. at 891. Judge Easterbrook used
the term "financial intermediary." Id. at 893.
246. Id. at 898.
247. Bonded Fin., 838 F.2d at 898.
248. Katzen, supra note 20, at 526.
249. Id.
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lenders and the transfer would be broken.2 5 This expansion of the
"mere conduit" notion, however, is insupportable.
In Bonded Financial,the court protected the bank from the abusive
possibilities under the Code's recovery provision; any entity which first
touched the funds could otherwise have been labeled an "initial transferee" from whom the trustee could recover.2 51 Far from being a purely
equitable response to a potentially bad result, this holding was justified
by tangible facts. The bank could not control the flow of the funds
and did not receive any benefit from the passage of funds through its
grasp.2 52 By contrast, the outsider-lender in the Deprizio situation had
complete control of the funds and, accordingly, was benefited. Thus, the
factual predicate of Bonded Financialis missing and the argument is then
reduced to one of equity. Yet as indicated above, equity concerns are not
sufficient to overcome the plain reading of unambiguous statutory
sections.2 53
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT To THE CODE
§ 550. Liability of transferee of avoided transfer
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the
extent that a transfer is avoided under sections 544, 545, 547,
548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover,
for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the
court so orders, the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee or such transfer, except that
a transfer avoidable under section 547 is not avoidable to the
extent that:
(i) the transferee is liable solely in the capacity
as an "initialtransferee" under section (a)(1); or
(ii) the transferee would have been entitled to
assert a defense under section 547(c), had that transferee been
(a) the initial beneficial recipient of the transferin question, or
(b) the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made;
If enacted these changes would correct the inequity occurring in a
Deprizio situation under the present Code. The mix-match situation
250. Id.

251. Bonded Fin., 838 F.2d at 898. See I1 U.S.C. § 550 for recovery provision.
252. Bonded Fin., 838 F.2d at 893.
253. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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which exists between sections 547 and 550 would be avoided. 254 The
transfer to the insider-guarantor supplies the necessary predicate for the
one-year liability period; thus, after amending the preference section, the
insider would be the targeted entity from whom there could be recovery.
Furthermore, such a change would be fair. It would support Congress' clear intention that there be two distinctive recovery periods for
insiders and non-insiders.2 55 It does not rely upon the difficult and disfavored task of inquiring into the outsider's subjective knowledge,2 5 6 and
therefore it preserves the Code's goal of presenting a concrete preference
test based upon observable, calculable transactions.2 57 In addition, the
proposed amendment would reconcile the present practice of recovering
preferential transfers with the past practices. Most importantly, it would
achieve the policy objective of preventing insiders from exploiting their
position and superior knowledge, without unduly influencing commercial
practices. Any concern that the outsider-creditors were manipulating
the collective process is best handled through the courts' power of equitable subordination.2 58
VIII.

CONCLUSION

At the center of the insider-guarantor and outsider-lender Deprizio
situation, is the Code's use of a single payment to constitute both a direct
and indirect transfer. 25 9 Because in reality only one transfer occurs, the
benefit to the insider invokes the one-year liability period, thus enabling
the trustee to avoid the transfer. Once avoided, the transfer is recoverable from either the creditor or the inside-guarantor. 2 ° Cases such as
Goldberger v. Davis Jay CorregatedBox Corp. (In re Mercon Industries
Inc.), 261 attempt to avoid this situation by adopting the theory that the
single payment results in two transfers. 26 2 Others, such as Bakst v. Schil254. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
255. Judge Easterbrook notes the necessity of two liability periods in his discussion on the
special problems posed by insiders. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874
F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989).
256. See supra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
257. See Jackson, supra note 3, at 765.
258. The courts have the power to equitably subordinate creditor claims. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1988). The generally recognized test for equitable subordination is found in In re Mobile Steel Co. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
259. See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text. In one article, the benefit received by
the guarantor is referred to as an indirect preference. See Lurey & Beckham, supra note 20, at

255-56.
260. See supra notes 90-93, 117-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of recoverable

transfers.
261. 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
262. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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264
ling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 2 6 3 simply invoke their equitable powers. 265
While these cases are convoluted in their interpretation of the Code,
they present an appealing means by which to resolve the inequity created
by Deprizio.2 66 However, only an amendment to the preference section
would truly enable "a finding of liability on one transfer [that] is in'26 7
dependent of the other, rather than derivative.
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263. 19 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
264. For additional examples see also Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc. (In re
Midwestern Co.), 96 Bankr. 224, (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo.
1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
265. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
266. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
267. Mercon, 37 Bankr. at 552.
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